Redacting the secret you didn't know was in the string
Catching secrets by shape rather than by name: patterns for provider key prefixes, URL userinfo and auth headers, plus a fuzzy fallback.
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77 pages
Go
I had the framework audited: every finding was the same shape
Every finding in a security audit reduced to untrusted input reaching a powerful operation unchecked. One checked chokepoint per boundary fixes it.
A mutex on a flag nobody writes twice
Why a write-once boolean still needs a mutex: the Go memory model needs a happens-before edge before another goroutine is guaranteed to see it.
The test-mocking pattern that races
Reassigning a package-level function variable in tests is a latent data race that t.Parallel exposes. The fix is structural, not another lock.
Testing code that calls an LLM: yes, you actually can
You cannot test the model, but you can test your code: snapshot the prompt as a golden file and mock the response to cover the ugly cases.
The AI provider that isn't an API
Five AI providers behind one Go interface, including one that shells out to a locally authenticated CLI for networks that allow no API calls.
AI conversations you can resume
Persisting an AI conversation in Go: snapshot the messages, prompt and tool metadata, and deliberately never the handlers or the API token.
An AI agent that has to make the build pass
Generate-and-hope does not work for codegen. Handing the draft to a repair agent with a fixed toolset that has to make build, test and lint pass.
Stop regex-ing the LLM's prose
Stop parsing an LLM's prose with regular expressions. Derive a JSON schema from your Go or Rust type so the schema and the type cannot drift.
Telemetry that asks first
Opt-in telemetry for a command-line tool: off until someone says yes, no personal data, a pluggable backend, and a consent flow that meets GDPR.
