A state bucket that defends itself
An OpenTofu state bucket that defends itself against corruption, deletion and its own operator, using lockfiles and prevent_destroy.

An OpenTofu state bucket that defends itself against corruption, deletion and its own operator, using lockfiles and prevent_destroy.

forbid(unsafe_code) is absolute, which is a problem when a dependency emits a link_section the lint counts as unsafe. Where the line ends up.

Why every shipping crate uses forbid(unsafe_code) rather than deny, which any module inside it can quietly override from the inside.

A checksum hosted beside your download stops accidents, not a compromised platform. Why the signing key has to live somewhere you control.

A vulnerability scanner is a one-day yes or no. Running cargo-deny as a standing policy gate instead, with waivers that expire on a date.

Self-update integrity for a CLI: verify the downloaded binary against the release checksums file, and decide whether to fail open or closed.

Making OS-keychain support provably absent from a Go binary for regulated or air-gapped builds, using a registry and a blank import.

Credential storage for a Go CLI: an env-var reference by default, an opt-in OS keychain, and plaintext only as a last resort and banned in CI.

A user-settable AI base URL decides where your API key gets sent. Validating it to reject userinfo, non-HTTPS schemes and redirects.

Catching secrets by shape rather than by name: patterns for provider key prefixes, URL userinfo and auth headers, plus a fuzzy fallback.
