Sign your own binaries with go-tool-base, part 5: embed the key and require verification
Embed the trust anchor in your binary and require signature verification on update, without bricking anyone already running an old build.

Embed the trust anchor in your binary and require signature verification on update, without bricking anyone already running an old build.

A checksum proves the bytes match the manifest, but says nothing about who wrote the manifest. Why self-update needs a signature instead.

Add self-update to a Go CLI: resolve releases per platform, compare versions, verify checksums and migrate config on upgrade.

A checksum hosted beside your download stops accidents, not a compromised platform. Why the signing key has to live somewhere you control.

A flaky self-update test: separate processes still shared a computed cache path and raced on disk. Process isolation is not filesystem isolation.

Self-update integrity for a CLI: verify the downloaded binary against the release checksums file, and decide whether to fail open or closed.
