Publish your key where the platform can't touch it
If the platform hosting your code also hands out the key that verifies it, the signature proves nothing. Where to publish a public key instead.
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13 pages
Supply-Chain
The marketplace I had to defend from my own attack surface
Opening a public marketplace for agent workflows meant publishing an attack surface, and then having to defend it from my own convenience.
One key, or two?
Launching sigillum, a standalone artefact signing and verification CLI, and the Rust signing problem that made it necessary.
Release trust without the framework
Two new public modules extracting the OpenPGP signing and verification model, so you can use it without adopting the whole framework.
Bought, not stolen
The philosophical end of the signing series: a stolen key and a bought one produce the same signature, and trust has to survive both.
The interpreter we forgot to sandbox
Hundreds of malicious package versions across three ecosystems, and the uncomfortable fact that installing one runs arbitrary code.
A signing key that never leaves KMS
Generate an asymmetric RSA-4096 signing key inside AWS KMS with no export path, then sign releases by calling kms:Sign instead of holding the key.
Anything under an 8
The national vulnerability database is buckling under defunding and volume, which changes what a severity score is actually worth.
Nobody's coming to clean your supply chain
Signed but poisoned packages show a signature proves who sent something, not what is in it. Nobody is coming to clean this up for you.
A signing key needs somewhere to live
A checksum hosted beside your download stops accidents, not a compromised platform. Why the signing key has to live somewhere you control.
